Two experiments evaluated the self-handicapping hypothesis that alcohol consumption varies directly with individuals' uncertainty of their ability to perform successfully. In a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, Experiment 1 manipulated (a) difficulty of an initial intellectual test (insolvable or solvable), (b) feedback regarding test performance (success or none), and (c) instructions regarding the difficulty of a retest (identical to or harder than the initial test). Ninety-six male normal drinkers then received access to an alcoholic beverage (self-handicapping option) and to study materials (performance-enchancing option). The experiment terminated before the retest. Results indicated that when a performance-enhancing option is available, subjects generally do not use alcohol to self-handicap. Experiment 2 omitted the study option and manipulated the test difficulty and retest instruction variables in a 2 X 2 factorial design. All 32 subjects received success feedback. Results showed that subjects use alcohol to self-handicap when denied access to a performance-enhancing option. With important qualifications, these data support the self-handicapping hypothesis of human drinking behavior.
Inconsistent support for tension-reduction models of drinking behavior (cf. Cappell, 1975) , which propose that persons consume alcohol to alleviate negative affect, has fostered alternative hypotheses that emphasize cognitive and contextual factors as determinants of human alcohol consumption (Marlatt, 1976; Russell & Mehrabian, 1975) . In a further break with traditional notions, Jones and Berglas (1978; used concepts derived from attribution theory and proposed that persons may use alcohol as a "self-handicapping strategy" in situations involving performance demands commonly believed to be disrupted by alcohol: If individuals are unsure of their The first experiment was based on a doctoral dissertation submitted to Vanderbilt University by Jalie A. Tucker under the supervision of Mark B. Sobell and was supported in part by Grant 5-T32-AA07072 from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Portions of this research were presented at the meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association, March 1980.
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Requests for reprints should be sent to Jalie Tucker, Department of Psychiatry, Box J-256, JHMHC, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32610. ability to perform successfully, excessive alcohol consumption may provide them with a plausible external justification for potential failure. This strategy would protect self-esteem by allowing failure to be attributed to the disruptive effects of alcohol, rather than to a lack of personal competence. Conversely, success achieved after excessive alcohol intake may enhance self-esteem by strengthening attributions about personal competence, since the success would have occurred despite the handicap of performing under alcohol's impairing effects. Jones and Berglas (1978) suggested two types of circumstances as especially conducive to self-handicapping behaviors (e.g., alcohol use, lack of studying, accentuation of a physical problem) and held that both types should simultaneously reduce performance-facilitating behaviors (e.g., intensive studying or physical preparation). First, selfhandicapping strategies should be more readily adopted when individuals believe that past successes on tasks similar to those impending may have been due to nonability factors such as luck, social status, or appearance. Second, even when past successes are perceived as having been contingent upon ability, persons should be more likely to self-handicap when they believe that their successes have created impending performance demands that may exceed their ability or may require excessive effort. Thus, "a performance Peter Principle often operates such that success propels a person into new and more demanding challenges where the risk of failure increases. This would seem to amplify further the appeal of self-handicapping strategies" (Jones & Berglas, 1978, p. 205) . Berglas and Jones (1978) reported two experiments that evaluated their hypothesis concerning drug use as a self-handicapping strategy. Under the guise of investigating drug effects on intellectual performance, the experimenters had college students first perform either insolvable or solvable analogies and then receive success feedback regarding their performance. Thus, the success feedback was noncontingent on performance for subjects who received the insolvable problems, but was contingent on performance for subjects who received the solvable problems. A no-feedback condition was also included in the second study to control for the effects of mere exposure to the two levels of task difficulty. Following these manipulations, subjects reported their preference for either an alleged performance-impairing or performance-enhancing drug before retaking a similar intellectual test. The drugs were fictitious, and the experiment terminated after subjects reported the type and amount of drug that they wanted to receive, which was the main dependent measure.
The results for male subjects in both experiments supported the self-handicapping hypothesis: Males who received noncontingent success feedback, and thus were most uncertain of their ability to succeed again on the retest, reported wanting to ingest significantly greater amounts of the alleged performance-impairing drug than those in the other experimental groups. Also, the two no-feedback control groups in the second study did not differ significantly, which suggests that noncontingent success feedback, not simply exposure to insolvable problems, is the critical determinant of self-handicapping.
These results show that performance-impairing drug use may be adopted as a selfhandicapping strategy. For several reasons, however, the self-handicapping hypothesis, particularly as it may apply to actual drinking behavior, requires further empirical evaluation. First, it remains undetermined whether Berglas and Jones's (1978) main dependent measure of subjects' verbalized preference between unfamiliar, fictitious drugs would be systematically related to subjects' actual alcohol consumption.
Second, as noted by Jones and Berglas (1978, p. 204) , circumstances hypothesized to be conducive to self-handicapping may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the adoption of that strategy. Other strategies may be available and perferred, such as attempting to ensure success through achievement strivings. Therefore, empirical investigations of self-handicapping may need to consider the effects of the availability and viability of alternative strategies on subjects' decisions to self-handicap.
Third, requiring subjects to make a mutually exclusive drug choice embodied but did not evaluate Jones and Berglas's assumption that conditions conducive to selfhandicapping simultaneously reduce performance-facilitating behaviors. An empirical evaluation of this hypothesized inverse relationship would entail allowing subjects to determine simultaneously the extent to which they engage in either or both types of behavior.
Finally, because Berglas and Jones's experiments were concerned primarily with evaluating the effects of noncontingent success on self-handicapping strategies, the relative self-handicapping properties of a Peter Principle situation (wherein greater performance demands follow contingent success) remain undetermined.
Based on these considerations, the two experiments reported below were designed to investigate the self-handicapping hypothesis as applied to actual alcohol consumption. Both studies measured subjects' alcohol intake in an intellectual performance situation patterned after Berglas and Jones's (1978) experiments. The general hypothesis in both experiments was that subjects' alcohol consumption would vary directly with uncertainty regarding their ability to sue-ceed on a subsequent retest of equal or greater difficulty than an initial test on which subjects were told that they had succeeded.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted under the guise of investigating the effects of self-selected alcohol doses on intellectual performance using a pretest-posttest system. Initial test difficulty (solvable or insolvable test) and performance feedback (success or no feedback) were manipulated, as in Berglas and Jones's second study, as well as the instructions given to subjects regarding the difficulty level of the promised retest (identical in difficulty or harder then the initial test). Inclusion of this third manipulation in a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design allowed a comparison of the hypothesized self-handicapping-eliciting effects of noncontingent success (accompanied by threat of either an identical or a more difficult retest) and contingent success accompanied by threat of a more difficult retest.
Following these manipulations, subjects received simultaneous access to an alcoholic beverage (self-handicapping option) and to relevant study materials (performance-facilitating option). These concurrent measures of subjects' drinking and studying permitted an evaluation of the hypothesized inverse relationship between performanceimpairing and facilitating behaviors. Moreover, the present facilitating option more closely paralleled college students' usual method of enhancing intellectual performance than did the (fictitious) drug option in Berglas and Jones's studies.
Four predictions were advanced. First, based on Jones and Berglas's main theoretical premise regarding the effects of noncontingent success, subjects who received noncontingent success feedback were predicted to consume significantly more alcohol than subjects who received contingent success feedback, regardless of their retest difficulty instruction condition.
Second, Jones and Berglas (p. 205) implied that contingent success plus threat of more difficult performance demands may motivate some degree of self-handicapping by also inducing ambiguity about one's ability to meet those demands. Therefore, contingent success subjects who expected a more difficult retest were predicted to consume significantly more alcohol than contingent success subjects who expected an identical retest, and significantly less alcohol than noncontingent success subjects, who should have been most unsure of their ability to succeed on the retest.
Third, based on Jones and Berglas's assumption regarding an inverse relationship between self-handicapping and performance-facilitating behaviors under the two circumstances conducive to self-handicapping, a reversed but otherwise identical pattern of results was predicted for subjects' study behavior within the four success feedback conditions. Fourth, Berglas and Jones's second experiment supported their contention that receipt of feedback is necessary to induce the ambiguity regarding ability that motivates strategies to avoid the negative competence implications of expected failure. Therefore, subjects in the four no-feedback control conditions were not predicted to differ significantly with respect to either their drinking or studying behavior.
Method
Subjects and experimenters. Ninety-six male undergraduates in an introductory psychology course at Vanderbilt University, aged 18-26 years, served as subjects (n = 12 per cell). Eighty-one students received course credit and 15 received $3 for their participation; the number of paid and unpaid subjects was roughly counterbalanced across the eight experimental groups. The data from 11 additional subjects were discarded due to equipment failure (2), their use of other drugs (2), habitual abstention from alcohol (1), and prior knowledge of the experimental deceptions (6), as determined during debriefing interviews. Each of the eight treatment groups contained 9 or 10 "heavy" and 2 or 3 "moderate" social drinkers, as assessed by the Drinking Practices Questionnaire (Cahalan, Cisin, & Crossley, 1969 ) and the brief form of the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (Pokorny, Miller, & Kaplan, 1972) . Subjects were asked not to use alcohol or other drugs on the day of their session and not to eat for 1 hour or drink any liquid for 1/2 hour prior to their session.
Two female experimenters conducted each experimental session. Three additional females, who were blind to subjects' treatment assignments, measured and recorded the primary drinking and studying dependent measures.
Stimulus materials.
The intellectual test administered to subjects consisted of concept formation problems presented on 10.16 X 15.24 cm white cards. Each card displayed different numbers of geometric shapes (e.g., circles, squares) and colored dots.
The alcoholic beverage (1,500 ml) was a mixture of 9.25 parts commercial orange juice to .75 parts 190-proof grain alcohol. The alcoholic content of the beverage was discernible. The beverage was contained in a 2.13-1 pitcher, and subjects were provided with a 150-ml cup.
The study manual made available to subjects was a loose-leaf notebook containing 5 pages of text veridically describing the test's rationale and strategies for solving concept formation problems and 11 pages of problems at all difficulty levels (25 total). The problems were like those used in the experimental task, and correct answers were given at the end of the manual.
Procedures. Subjects participated individually in 75-minute experimental sessions that were conducted in the late afternoon and early evening. After receiving a breath test (Alco-Analyzer, Luckey Laboratories, Inc.) to ensure their blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was zero, subjects were seated at a table across from Experimenter 1, who instructed them regarding the experiment's ostensible purpose. Subjects were told that in order to investigate the effects of multiple, self-selected doses of alcohol on intellectual performance, they would first be administered a concept formation test in a drug-free state. The test was described to them as a nonverbal test of intellectual ability that "eliminated racial, sexual, or cultural biases often found in equivalent written tests such as the SAT." The test was said to "discriminate the uppermost levels of intellectual potential," so that they should expect to score "no higher than between the 60th and 70th percentiles" (Berglas & Jones, 1978, p. 408) . " Subjects were further instructed that after the initial test they would be given free access to an alcoholic beverage and an opportunity to review test-related study materials before retaking the intellectual test. Finally, subjects were told that in order to control for the possible effects on their test performance of various subjective factors (i.e., their mood, physical state, and reactions to the test), they would be asked periodically to complete several relevant questionnaires. After answering any questions. Experimenter 1 had subjects read and sign an informed-consent form.
Experimenter 1 then left subjects alone to complete two questionnaires that were not directly relevant to the experimental hypothesis (Mood Adjective Check List, or MACL, Nowlis, 1965; Achieving Tendency Scale, Mehrabian, 1969) . After subjects completed the questionnaires, Experimenter 2 entered the room and explained and administered the concept formation test that was appropriate for subjects' test difficulty condition (solvable or insolvable problems). As described more fully in Tucker, Vuchinich, Sobell, and Maisto (1980) , the test involved showing subjects sets of six stimulus cards, one card at a time. The subjects' task was to identify verbally the underlying classification rule, or concept, for a given set of cards, using as few of the six available cards as possible. Even if subjects viewed all six cards in a given set, they were still required to give a concept answer. For subjects who received the solvable problems, a given set of six cards contained an underlying concept (e.g., blue dots and circles; two squares), but for subjects who received the insolvable problems, the cards contained complex, random patterns that lacked an underlying concept. During the approximately 5-minute test interval, Experimenter 2 provided no feedback regarding the accuracy of subjects' concept answers.
After completion of the test, but before the performance feedback manipulation, Experimenter 2 asked subjects to estimate the percentage of their concept answers that were correct (0%-100% correct). Experimenter 2 then introduced the feedback manipulation. Subjects in the success feedback condition were enthusiastically told that they had performed exceptionally well, and subjects in the no-feedback condition were told nothing about their performance. Experimenter 2 then left the room to summon Experimenter 1.
On returning, Experimenter 1 instructed subjects about the difficulty level of the promised retest. Subjects in the more difficult retest condition were told that in order to control for possible practice effects on their retest performance, the second test would be noticeably harder than the first test, and they would be penalized for guessing (i.e., wrong answers would be subtracted from the total correct). Subjects in the identical retest condition were told that the second test would be of exactly the same difficulty level as the first test (i.e., "a parallel form"). All independent variable manipulations were established at this point.
Experimenter 1 then left subjects alone to complete the MACL for a second time, as well as a questionnaire designed to assess the effectiveness of the experimental treatments. This second questionnaire asked subjects to rate (a) their initial test performance relative to other college students on a 9-point scale (-4 = "one of the worst scores" and +4 = "one of the best scores"), (b) the percentage to which their initial performance was due to luck versus ability (from 100% luck/0% ability to 0% luck/100% ability), and (c) the expected difficulty of the retest relative to the initial test on a 9-point scale (-4 = "very much harder" and +4 = "very much easier").
Experimenter 1 then returned with the alcoholic beverage and a study manual, both of which were placed on the table in front of the subjects. Experimenter 1 then instructed subjects that during the forthcoming 15-minute interval, they could drink as much or as little of the alcoholic beverage as they desired, since "performance measures were needed from subjects at different alcohol dose levels, including no-alcohol." Subjects were also told that they might or might not find the study manual helpful, so that it was entirely up to them whether or not they chose to review it.
Subjects were then left alone with the drinking and studying materials for 15 minutes. During this inverval, one or two research assistants observed subjects through an unobtrusive one-way mirror and used a stopwatch to record the cumulative time that subjects studied. Subjects were considered to be studying when they were holding the manual within approximately .914 m of their eyes, the correct direction of the print was oriented less than 90° on either side of their gaze, and their eyes were focused on the printed material. The three research assistants who served as raters were trained to use these criteria in a pretest study that involved 10 subjects. The average interrater reliability, across the three rater pairs, was .997 for the 19 experimental subjects observed by two raters.
After the drinking-studying interval, Experimenter 1 removed the study manual and alcoholic beverage from the experimental room and asked subjects to complete a postexperimental questionnaire designed to assess further the effectiveness of the treatment manipulations. Subjects were then thoroughly debriefed and administered a breath test to determine their BAG.
Results
Unless otherwise specified, all data analyses were 2X2X2 (Test Difficulty X Feedback X Retest Instruction) analyses of variance.
Manipulation checks. As predicted, success feedback subjects (A/=1.63) rated their initial test performance more highly than did no-feedback subjects (M -.22), F(l, 88) = 27.66,p < .001, and solvable test subjects (M = 1.49) rated their performance more highly than did insolvable test subjects (M = .36), F( 1, 88) = 17.86, p < .001. These main effects attest to the effectiveness of the feedback and test difficulty manipulations, respectively.
Subjects' prefeedback test accuracy estimates and their performance attributions to luck versus ability further supported the effectiveness of the noncontingent-contingent success manipulation. As predicted, prior to feedback insolvable test subjects (M = 33.08%) rated their answers as less accurate overall than did solvable test subjects (M= 67.00%), t(94) = 9.37,;? < .001. Also as predicted, following feedback insolvable test subjects attributed their performance more to luck (M = 47.46%) than did solvable test subjects (M= 24.81%), F(l, 88) = 30.96, /x.OOl. A significant Test Difficulty X Feedback interaction was also found, F(\, 88) = 5.76, p = .017, and was examined using Tukey's pairwise comparison procedure (Kirk, 1968) , with « = .05 and honestly significant difference (HSD) = 15.11. Consistent with the test difficulty main effect, insolvable test/nofeedback subjects (M= 53.67%) made greater luck attributions than solvable test/ no-feedback subjects (M= 21.25%) and solvable test/success feedback subjects (M = 28.38%); insolvable test/success feedback subjects (M = 41.25%) also made greater luck attributions than solvable test/no-feedback subjects. However, the solvable and insolvable test subjects given success feedback did not differ significantly, although their mean ratings were in the predicted direction. These combined results suggest that insolvable test subjects were uncertain of their answers, although they subsequently claimed their success as relatively ability-related.
Subjects' ratings of expected retest difficulty showed that as predicted, harder retest subjects (M = -1.04) expected a more difficult retest than did identical retest subjects (M = .43), F(\, 88) = 27.98, p < .001, and insolvable test subjects (M = -.74) expected a more difficult retest than did solvable test subjects (M = .13), F(l, 88) = 10.02, p = .003. However, significant Feedback X Retest Instruction, F(l, 88) = 4.63, p = .032, and Test Difficulty X Feedback X Retest Instruction, F(l, 88) = 5.83, p = .017, interactions qualified these main effects. The four first-order interaction means, presented in Table 1 , were examined with Tukey's procedure (a = .05, HSD = 1.03). The means followed the main effects, except that the difference between the two retest instruction group means was not significant under success feedback. Pairwise comparisons (a = .05, HSD = 1.73) of the eight second-order interaction means, also presented in Table  1 , showed that the nonsignificant difference in the first-order interaction was largely due to the solvable test/harder retest/success feedback group, which responded similarly to all identical retest groups. Otherwise, the treatment means followed the predicted retest instruction and test difficulty main effects.
Finally, on 9-point scales (-4 = "very great impairment" and +4 = "very great facilitation") on the postexperimental questionnaire, subjects reported that both before (grand M = -1.21) and after (grand M = -1.09) the drinking-studying interval, they expected alcohol intake to impair their retest performance. Likewise, subjects reported that both before (grand M = .97) and after (grand M = .30) the drinking-studying interval, they expected studying to facilitate their retest performance. .65
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Tests of the a priori hypotheses. The means and standard deviations of subjects' alcoholic beverage consumption, final BAC, and cumulative study time are presented in Table 2 . The set of a priori hypotheses for each dependent measure was tested separately using Dunn's procedure (Kirk, 1968) , with a = .05 (one-tailed) and the set of hypotheses as the conceptual unit for error rate. For subjects' alcohol intake, noncontingent success subjects consumed marginally significantly more alcohol than contingent success subjects, regardless of retest difficulty instructions (</=148.77, ^ = 177.22, p < .09). Also as predicted, noncontingent success/identical retest subjects consumed significantly more alcohol than contingent success/harder retest subjects (</= 210.65, ^ = 221.16, p< .05). These same differences were likewise the only significant comparisons for subjects' BACs. Noncontingent success subjects had higher BACs than contingent success subjects (d = .0075, $ = .0076, p < .05), and noncontingent success/identical retest subjects had higher BACs than contingent success/ harder retest subjects (d = .011, ^ = .014, p < .05). Overall, these findings provided highly tentative support for the main selfhandicapping prediction that noncontingent success elicits greater alcohol use than contingent success, but they did not support the Peter Principle prediction that contingent success plus the threat of a more difficult retest also elicits some degree of self-handicapping.
Contrary to predictions, the results of subjects' study behavior generally did not follow a pattern reversed but otherwise identical to their drinking behavior. Although, as predicted, contingent success/harder retest subjects studied significantly more than noncontingent success/identical retest subjects (d = 2.47, $ = 2.64, p < .05), they also studied more than contingent success/identical retest subjects (^ = -3.21); the two-tailed probability for this unpredicted reversed difference is .055 (d = 3.23). No other comparisons approached significance. Thus, the results obtained for subjects' study behavior seem largely attributable to the relatively greater studying of contingent success/ harder retest subjects.
Overall analyses of drinking and studying behavior. The statistically nonindependent alcohol consumption and BAC measures were examined with multivariate and univariate 2X2X2 analyses of variance. None of these analyses yielded any significant effects. In contrast, a univariate analysis of variance of subjects' study time showed a significant retest instruction main effect, F( 1, 88) = 3.96, p = .047, with harder retest subjects studying more than identical retest subjects, and a marginally significant feedback main effect, F(l, 88) = 3.50,;? = .061, with no-feedback subjects studying more than success feedback subjects. A marginally significant three-way interaction was also obtained, F(l, 88) = 3.51, p = .061. Although its marginal significance precluded further statistical examination, visual inspection, along with the a priori comparisons for study time, suggested that the interaction was largely due to contingent success/harder retest subjects studying more than other success feedback subjects. No pronounced differences were apparent among the four nofeedback groups.
Discussion
At best, these results provided only limited support for the main self-handicapping prediction that noncontingent success elicits greater alcohol use than contingent success. The additional Peter Principle prediction Note. BAC = blood alcohol concentration. Units of measurement are in milliliters for alcohol intake, mg ethanol/ 100 ml blood for BAC, and minutes for study time.
was not supported in any analysis, nor did subjects' studying behavior parallel their drinking behavior in the predicted reversed pattern. Instead, as indicated by the a priori comparisons, contingent success subjects who expected a harder retest studied more than both noncontingent and contingent success subjects who expected an identical retest. The overall study time analysis further revealed that harder retest subjects and nofeedback subjects studied more than identical retest subjects and success feedback subjects, respectively. This lack of strong support for the selfhandicapping hypothesis probably does not reflect methodological inadequacies, since none of the manipulation checks seriously questioned the adequacy of the independent variable treatments. Instead, though neither the drinking nor studying behavior findings were particularly robust, the positive results that were obtained occurred largely with respect to subjects' studying, rather than drinking, behavior. Therefore, the data seem best interpreted in terms of subjects' differential adoption of a performance-enhancing, rather than a self-handicapping, strategy.
Specifically, these data may generally reflect subjects' adoption of the performanceenhancing study option according to the degree to which they perceived studying as necessary or potentially beneficial to their retest performance. Thus, success feedback subjects may have studied less than no-feedback subjects because they believed that retest success did not require extensive prior studying, given that they had succeeded on the initial test without studying. Similarly, subjects who expected a harder retest may have studied more than subjects who expected an identical retest because they perceived that relatively greater studying would likely be required to maintain their initial test performance on the more difficult retest.
This general interpretation may also account for the differential studying behavior of success feedback subjects that was suggested by the a priori comparisons and the marginally significant second-order interaction. First, the relatively greater study time of contingent success subjects who expected a harder retest may reflect those subjects' realistic belief that studying would be both helpful and necessary for maintaining their initial success on the more difficult but presumably solvable retest. These subjects' relatively lower alcohol intake and BACs may also reflect their simultaneous efforts to minimize any alcohol-induced retest impairment, which provides some support for the hypothesized inverse relationship between self-handicapping and performanceenhancing behaviors. Second, the relatively lower study time of contingent success subjects who expected an identical retest may reflect their belief that extensive studying was not essential for retest success, given that they had just succeeded on an identical test because of personal ability and without prior studying. Finally, the similarly low study time of noncontingent success subjects may reflect their accurate perception that studying was an ineffective means of assuring continued success on an exceedingly difficult (insolvable) test where previous success had been largely attributed to luck.
Regardless of the validity of this interpretation of the study time results, the present lack of strong support for the self-handicapping hypothesis questions its applicability when simultaneous opportunities exist to self-handicap through alcohol use and to facilitate performance through familiar means (i.e., studying). The discrepancy between Berglas and Jones's results and the present findings seems most defensibly explained by assuming that those authors' performanceenhancing drug option did not give their subjects a viable and familiar performance-facilitating alternative to self-handicapping. Thus, while their findings imply that college males will self-handicap with drug use when given an inadequate performance-enhancing option, the present results suggest that they will elect a familiar performance-enhancing strategy, if one is available, according to its perceived necessity for future success. Nevertheless, it remains undetermined if college males will self-handicap with alcohol in either situation hypothesized to elicit that effect when they are denied access to a viable performance-enhancing strategy, such as studying.
Experiment 2

Rationale and Method
The second experiment was conducted to evaluate this interpretation of the lack of strong support for the selfhandicapping predictions obtained in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 in design and procedure, except for two important changes. First, to determine if college males use alcohol to self-handicap when a viable performance-enhancing option is unavailable, subjects in Experiment 2 were not given access to test-related study materials during the 15-minute measurement interval. Instead, they were only given access to an alcoholic beverage (self-handicapping option) and to test-irrelevant, neutral reading material (i.e., popular magazines such as Time and People). Second, only the four success feedback groups were included in Experiment 2 in a 2 X 2 (Test Difficulty X Retest Instruction) factorial design.' Subjects in Experiment 2 were 32 male normaldrinker students in introductory psychology classes at the University of Florida (n = 8 per cell). All subjects received course credit for their participation and were proportionally matched with respect to drinking history with the subjects in Experiment 1; that is, each treatment group contained one or two moderate and six or seven heavy social drinkers. As in Experiment 1, a research assistant blind to subjects' treatment conditions measured and recorded the quantity of subjects' alcoholic beverage consumption.
Results
Unless otherwise specified, all data analyses were 2x2 (Test Difficulty X Retest Instruction) analyses of variance.
Manipulation checks. As predicted, solvable test subjects (M = 2.58) rated their initial test performance more highly than did insolvable test subjects (M= 1.36), F(l, 28) = 5.33, p = .029, and insolvable test subjects (M = 44.06%) attributed their performance more to luck than did solvable test subjects (M= 20.38%), F(l, 28) =13.79, p< .001. Likewise, insolvable test subjects (M= 31.25%) rated their answers as less accurate overall than did solvable test subjects (M= 74.38%), f(30) = 7.31, p< .001. Consistent with predictions, harder retest subjects (M = -1.76) reported expecting a more difficult retest than did identical retest subjects (M= -.85), F(l, 28) = 6.25, p = .019. Subjects again reported that both before (grand M = -.92) and after (grand M= -1.13) the drinking interval, they expected alcohol intake to impair their retest performance.
Tests of the a priori hypotheses. The means and standard deviations of subjects' alcoholic beverage consumption and final BACs are presented in Table 3 . Dunn's procedure was again used to test the a priori hypotheses. As predicted, noncontingent success subjects consumed more alcohol than contingent success subjects, regardless of retest difficulty instructions (d = 101.45, =150.50, p < .01), and noncontingent success/identical retest subjects consumed marginally significantly more alcohol than contingent success/harder retest subjects (d= 143.47,^ = 122.00, p<. 08). The Peter Principle prediction was not supported. Similarly, for subjects' BACs, only the main selfhandicapping prediction regarding the ef-fects of noncontingent success was supported. Noncontingent success subjects had significantly higher BACs than contingent success subjects (d = .0052, ^ = .0055, p < .05), and noncontingent success/identical retest subjects had marginally significantly higher BACs than contingent success/harder retest subjects (d = .0073, $ = .0070, p < .06).
Overall analyses of drinking behavior. A 2X2 multivariate analysis of variance of subjects' alcohol intake and BACs showed a significant test difficulty main effect, F(2, 27) = 3.80, p = .035. Test difficulty main effects were also found in separate univariate analyses of variance of subjects' alcohol intake, F(l, 28) = 7.86, p = .009, and BACs, F(l, 28) = 4.33, p = .047. As predicted by the self-handicapping hypothesis, noncontingent success subjects consumed more alcoholic beverage and had higher BACs than contingent success subjects.
General Discussion
In contrast to the marginal results in Experiment 1, the findings of both the alcohol intake and BAC measures in Experiment 2 strongly supported the main self-handicapping prediction that noncontingent success elicits greater self-handicapping through alcohol use than does contingent success. Neither study, however, supported the additional prediction that initial success incumbent upon ability, followed by threat .009
Note. BAC = blood alcohol concentration. All groups received success feedback.
of greater performance demands, also elicits some degree of self-handicapping. The discrepant results for subjects' drinking behavior in Experiments 1 and 2 could be due to methodological variations in the studies, rather than to theoretically relevant considerations. For example, since the studies were conducted at different universities, their discrepant findings may partially reflect population differences in relevant personality variables (e.g., achievement motivation, fear of success). However, any population differences of this type would not meaningfully alter the interpretation of each study's group results. Instead, such differences merely pose an empirical question concerning the relationship of individual differences in personality to tendencies to adopt either a performance-enhancing strategy or a self-handicapping strategy. Thus, with some important qualifications that are discussed below, these data lend credence to Jones and Berglas's (1978) generalization of their fictitious drug studies to actual drinking behavior.
Most importantly, the combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that the selfhandicapping prediction regarding noncontingent success and alcohol use seems to hold clearly only when subjects are denied access to a viable performance-enhancing strategy for avoiding anticipated failure. When a reasonable performance-enhancing option is available, as in Experiment 1, normal-drinker college males attempt to assure success through achievement strivings according to the degree to which such strivings seem necessary or potentially beneficial for future success. When such a performance-enhancing option is unavailable, however, as in Experiment 2, subjects much more readily adopt the self-handicapping strategy.
The support obtained in Experiment 2 for the self-handicapping prediction regarding noncontingent success may require qualification because that study did not include the no-feedback control groups. Therefore, the possibility exists that exposure to insolvable problems, rather than exposure to insolvable problems plus noncontingent success feedback, was the primary determinant of subjects' alcohol intake. This alternative inter-pretation is implied by traditional tensionreduction models of alcohol consumption (i.e., that the stress induced by the insolvable problems increased drinking). Although this explanation for the results of Experiment 2 cannot be fully ruled out, it seems unlikely, given that analyses of subjects' MACL anxiety scores yielded no significant differences in either experiment.
In addition to qualifying Jones and Berglas's self-handicapping model in terms of the relative availability and viability of alternative performance-enhancing options, this research suggests that a Peter Principle situation may not elicit self-handicapping, even when a reasonable performance-enhancing option is not available, as in Experiment 2. Two reasons may be suggested, however, for why the Peter Principle hypothesis was not supported. First, the harder retest instructions may have led those subjects to believe that the retest would be so difficult that no one could perform well. If this were the case, then retest failure could have been attributed to the difficulty of the retest, instead of the subjects' incompetence, which should have eliminated the motivation of subjects in the success feedback/harder retest conditions to self-handicap. Although this possibility may seem to explain the lack of support for the Peter Principle prediction for contingent success/harder retest subjects, this same argument implies that the self-handicapping motives of noncontingent success/harder retest subjects should likewise have been eliminated. This latter implication is clearly inconsistent with the alcohol consumption results obtained in Experiment 2.
A second, more plausible account of the lack of support for the Peter Principle prediction is that the retest instruction manipulation may not have operationalized all essential properties of a Peter Principle situation. While threat of a more difficult retest obviously is a central component of a Peter Principle situation, and was manipulated in this research, another essential aspect may be that receipt of a more difficult retest must be made explicitly contingent upon having succeeded on a prior test. This second component was not included in the present studies and thus may have contributed to the lack of support for the Peter Principle prediction.
With these qualifications, the present support for the basic self-handicapping hypothesis regarding the effects of noncontingent success on drinking behavior has implications for conceptualizing and investigating the development of alcohol problems in high resource populations. To date, studies of the development and maintenance of alcohol dependence typically have focused on the visible population of relatively disadvantaged individuals whose drinking problems exacerbate their existing marginal adjustment. The present data suggest, however, that seemingly successful persons, who lack obvious financial or interpersonal problems, may be at risk for alcohol problems if they perceive that past successes were due to nonability factors and if they feel that adaptive, achievement-oriented strategies to avoid failure are exhausted or inaccessible. Determining the relative contribution of these two variables to the hypothesized development of alcohol problems via a self-handicapping mechanism raises clinically relevant questions for further research within this conceptual framework.
In conclusion, this research tentatively supports the self-handicapping hypothesis as a framework for investigating the determinants of alcohol consumption. However, in order to extend the hypothesis fully to human drinking behavior, future research must determine whether alcohol use as a selfhandicapping strategy alters subsequent attribution processes in the predicted manner; that is, does self-handicapping with alcohol actually protect or enhance self-esteem if one fails or succeeds, respectively, on a subsequent task? Nevertheless, the initial support obtained here for the self-handicapping hypothesis is significant in its contrast with traditional, unsupported models of alcoholism, which emphasize the role of negative events and pharmacological variables in determining excessive drinking. Along with other evidence that indicates the importance of nonpharmacological variables (e.g., contextual and expectancy factors) in human alcohol consumption (Marlatt, 1976; Vuch-inich & Tucker, 1980) , this research suggests the value of approaching the study of drinking behavior within a more naturalistic, social psychological perspective.
